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Abstract
Our reliance on face photos for identity verification is at odds with extensive research which shows that matching
pairs of unfamiliar faces is highly prone to error. This process can therefore be exploited by identity fraudsters
seeking to deceive ID checkers (e.g., using a stolen passport which contains an image of a similar looking individual
to deceive border control officials). In this study we build on previous work which sought to quantify the threat
posed by a relatively new type of fraud: morphed passport photos. Participants were initially unaware of the
presence of morphs in a series of face photo arrays and were simply asked to detect which images they thought
had been digitally manipulated (i.e., “images that didn’t look quite right”). All participants then received basic
information on morph fraud and rudimentary guidance on how to detect such images, followed by a morph
detection training task (Training Group, n = 40), or a non-face control task (Guidance Group, n = 40). Participants also
completed a post-guidance/training morph detection task and the Models Face Matching Test (MFMT). Our
findings show that baseline morph detection rates were poor, that morph detection training significantly improved
the identification of these images over and above basic guidance, and that accuracy in the mismatch condition of
the MFMT correlated with morph detection ability. The results are discussed in relation to potential
countermeasures for morph-based identity fraud.
Keywords: Face morphs, Identity fraud, Identity verification, Individual differences, Super-recogniser, Face matching,
Face recognition, Passports, Biometrics
Significance statement
The use of fraudulent passports for identity verification
represents a significant threat to national security.
Modern passports contain counterfeit prevention mea-
sures (e.g., printed patterns visible only under specific arti-
ficial illumination) which make any attempts to alter or
duplicate the document itself unlikely to go unnoticed. As
a result, fraudsters are now known to be focusing on
obtaining FOG (fraudulently obtained but genuine) pass-
ports. FOG passports are real documents which are
wrongly issued to fraudulent applicants, and they arise
when a confederate, who holds a genuine passport, sub-
mits a renewal application with the photo of a similar
looking client. If the mismatch between the renewal image
and the image held on file goes undetected, a FOG pass-
port is issued which can be used illegally by the client
individual. In a recent advancement in this approach,
criminals are seeking to increase their success rate by sub-
mitting a morphed passport photo, an image of the con-
federate and the client which has been digitally blended
together and which retains a likeness of both individuals.
Border security agencies have only recently detected the
use of passport morphs, and research is required to ensure
that the relevant agencies and practitioners stay one step
ahead of these criminal attacks. Here we use applied psy-
chological science to quantify morph detection rates, to
assess the effectiveness of a morph detection training task,
and to evaluate the use of individuals who show a high
aptitude on a test of unfamiliar face matching as a poten-
tial countermeasure.
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Background
Our reliance on passport photos for identity verification is
critical to our border security (see Robertson & Burton,
2016). Advances in passport anti-counterfeit measures
(e.g., the use of printed patterns visible only under specific
artificial illumination) make traditional fraud attacks (e.g.,
creating a fake passport or the removal and replacement
of the photo) unlikely to go undetected (UK HM Passport
Office Report, 2013; UK National Fraud Authority Report,
2011). As a consequence, fraudsters are now attempting
to obtain FOG (fraudulently obtained but genuine) pass-
ports (ITW Security Division White Paper, 2017; Middle-
ton, 2014). FOG passports are real documents which have
been mistakenly issued to fraudulent applicants. Such doc-
uments can arise through a variety of methods, as outlined
below, but the most direct route occurs when a confed-
erate, who holds a genuine passport, submits a renewal
application with the photo of a similar looking fraud-
ster. If the mismatch between the renewal image and
the image held on file goes unnoticed, a FOG passport
is issued which can be used illegally by the fraudster.
This type of fraud exploits a weakness that results from
our reliance on unfamiliar face matching for identity
verification (Jenkins, White, Van Montfort, & Burton,
2011; Kemp, Towell, & Pike, 1997; White, Kemp, Jenkins,
Matheson, & Burton, 2014). Extensive research has shown
that detecting that two similar looking faces are in fact dif-
ferent people (i.e., detecting fraud) is a challenging task
and one which is prone to error (see Bruce et al., 1999;
Burton, 2013; Davis & Valentine, 2009; Robertson,
Middleton, & Burton, 2015; Young & Burton, 2017).
This issue is being exacerbated by recent advances in
image manipulation software which allow fraudsters to
easily create morphed passport photos.
Internet users, and even those using smartphones,
now have access to a variety of face image manipulation
apps that support the digital morphing of the face pho-
tos of two different people, with such images retaining
facial information that is specific to both identities (see
Figs. 1 and 2 for examples). The advantage to the fraud-
ster of using morphs over a similar looking confederate
photo is that the image retains some of the confederate’s
face and may therefore be more likely to be accepted as
a match to the photo held on file at passport renewals. If
the morph were to be accepted as a match, a FOG pass-
port would be issued which could be used illegally by the
fraudster for identity verification purposes (see Makrushin,
Neubert, & Dittmann, 2017; Scherhag et al., 2017). The
same process could be repeated even without access to a
confederate in situations in which the fraudster has access
to stolen identity details.
A recent study by Robertson, Kramer, and Burton
(2017) was the first to assess the detection rates for
morphed passport photos by human recognisers in a
passport photo-to-face-photo matching context. As
shown in Fig. 1, on each trial, participants had to decide
whether to accept a passport photo as a match to a
genuine face (left image), either with no prior awareness
of there being morphs in the set (i.e., the applied sce-
nario before this type of fraud came to light) or with an
awareness of the morphs and the explicit instruction to
detect them. The results showed that acceptance rates
for 50% morphs, the grade which is most likely to confer
a benefit to fraudsters, was 68% in the no-awareness
condition, suggesting that these images do provide a
viable route to identity fraud (see also Ferrara, Franco, &
Maltoni, 2016). Although it is the case that morph ac-
ceptance rates fell to 21% after participants had been
provided with some rudimentary morph detection guid-
ance, 50% morphs were still a more successful form of
fraud than simply using the genuine photo of another,
similar looking, person.
Fig. 1 Example trial from Robertson et al. (2017). The image to the left was always known to be genuine; the task was to decide whether the
passport photo was a genuine match (real photo of the same person), a mismatch (real photo of a different but similar looking person) or a
morph (digitally created blend of two different face photos). (The photo in the passport frame depicts a 50% morph.)
Robertson et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2018) 3:27 Page 2 of 11
These findings quantified morph detection rates in the
presence of a photo which was known to be genuine,
mirroring the morph fraud process outlined above, in
which passport renewal officers compare an incoming
morph with a genuine passport photo held on file. How-
ever, Robertson et al. (2017) did not address purely op-
portunistic morph fraud, in which a fraudster submits
an entirely new passport application with a morphed
photo. In this context, in which an existing passport
does not exist (i.e., there is no previous comparison
photo held on file), the fraudster is simply relying on the
official’s failure to detect that they have submitted a
digitally manipulated photo of two different people.
Again, were a FOG passport to be mistakenly issued in
this context, two individuals would then be able to use
the same document. Despite the threat posed by this
type of attack, the extent to which morphs can be
detected in the absence of a comparison image that is
known (or is at least very likely) to be genuine has not
yet been established.
In line with the growing focus on individual differences
in face recognition performance (see Dennett, McKone,
Edwards, & Susilo, 2012; Furl, Garrido, Dolan, Driver, &
Duchaine, 2011; Wilmer et al., 2010), Robertson et al.
(2017) also assessed whether individual levels of accuracy
on items from the Glasgow Face Matching Test (GFMT;
Burton, White, & McNeill, 2010), a well-established test of
unfamiliar face matching ability, predicted morph detec-
tion rates. Although recent work on ‘super-recognisers’
(SRs) has shown that SR performance tends to correlate
across face-processing tasks (i.e., memory and matching;
Bobak, Hancock, & Bate, 2016; Davis, Lander, Evans, &
Jansari, 2016; Robertson, Noyes, Dowsett, Jenkins, &
Burton, 2016), morph detection does not rely on identity
recognition, and so it was not clear whether accuracy on
face identification tasks would generalise to the detection
of digitally manipulated face images.
Robertson et al. (2017) reported that participants’
morph detection rates did correlate with GFMT accur-
acy, but only for scores in the mismatch condition. That
is, participants who scored highly in detecting that two
similar looking faces were in fact two different people
also identified a greater number of morphs. However,
the full GFMT was not completed separately from the
morph task, with match/mismatch accuracy being calcu-
lated from the small number of genuine match/mis-
match trials used in the morph task (i.e., non-morph
pairs; 7 per match/mismatch condition per participant).
Therefore, although the correlation between morph de-
tection and GFMT mismatch accuracy appears to extend
recent work on the generalisability of the skills of
high-performing face recognisers, or SRs, and their po-
tential usefulness as a morph fraud counter-measure,
further investigation is required to assess the reliability
of this relationship.
The study by Robertson et al. (2017) provided important
data in terms of quantifying the acceptance of morphed
passport photos in the presence of a genuine comparison
photo. In the present study we build on this work in three
important ways. First, we examine morph detection rates
when participants are simply asked to detect images that
look as though they have been digitally manipulated, with
no awareness that there are morphs in the set. This
process mirrors the task facing passport-issuing officials
who may be unaware of this type of fraud when con-
fronted by a fresh application that contains a morph. Sec-
ond, we contrast the effectiveness of the rudimentary
morph detection guidance provided by Robertson et al.
(2017), with a morph detection training task which pro-
vides participants with feedback on their performance.
Third, we seek to establish the reliability of the association
between mismatch accuracy on an unfamiliar face match-
ing test and morph detection ability.
Methods
Participants
Eighty participants were recruited for this study during a
public engagement workshop and were randomly assigned
to the Training Group or the Guidance Group. Sample
characteristics are reported in Table 1. There was no group
difference in age (t < 1). The ethics committee of the
School of Psychological Sciences and Health (University of
Fig. 2 Examples of the face images used in the pre-array, post-array and morph training tasks
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Strathclyde) approved this research. All participants pro-
vided written informed consent.
Stimuli and apparatus
Face images
The face morphs used in this study were selected from
the set of 49 identity pairs used by Robertson et al.
(2017). For each identity pair, morphs were available in
10% gradations between Identity 1 and Identity 2. How-
ever, as shown in Fig. 2, we selected only 30%, 40% and
50% morphs for use in the present study. These morphs
were selected because they are within the range that is
likely to confer the greatest benefit to an identity fraud-
ster in a passport fraud context (see Robertson et al.,
2017, for related discussion) and are therefore most
likely to be presented to passport officials. Within each
of the 49 identity pairs, there are two 30% morphs (i.e.,
30% of Identity 1 and 70% of Identity 2; 30% of Identity
2 and 70% of Identity 1), two 40% morphs (i.e., 40% of
Identity 1 and 60% of Identity 2; 40% of Identity 2 and
60% of Identity 1) and one 50% morph. Therefore, the
present morph set consisted of 98 30% morphs, 98 40%
morphs and 49 50% morphs. The 2 genuine images from
each pair (98 images) were selected as foils. All images
matched the size of real UK passport photos (3.5 cm ×
4.5 cm) and were presented in colour on a white
background.
Models Face Matching Test
Our version of the Models Face Matching Test (MFMT)
consisted of 60 pairs (2 shortened versions combined) of
unconstrained, highly variable face photos of male
models. Within the test, as is the case with the GFMT,
there are two subtests consisting of match trials (same
person, different image) and mismatch trials (different,
but similar looking, people) (see Dowsett & Burton,
2015, for further information). The MFMT is designed
to be more difficult than the GFMT (Burton et al.,
2010), on which it is based; it is therefore likely to pro-
vide a more sensitive measure of individual differences
in face-matching ability. In addition, because the morph
images were derived from GFMT faces, the use of a sep-
arate matching test rules out a potential confound in
terms of the repetition of faces.
Procedure
The procedure for both the Guidance Group and the
Training Group is summarised in Fig. 3. On entering the
testing space, participants were invited to sit at a testing
station, to read all of the on-screen instructions, and to
begin the task when ready. All participants completed an
initial morph detection task (to quantify baseline per-
formance); they then received basic morph awareness/
detection information (as used by Robertson et al.,
2017), followed by a morph training task (Training
Group) or a non-face (selective attention) control task
(Guidance Group). The training blocks were followed by
a post-guidance/training morph detection task and com-
pletion of the MFMT.
In the baseline morph detection task, participants were
asked to take on the role of a passport fraud officer who
is trying to detect passport photos that have been digit-
ally manipulated. These instructions were kept deliber-
ately vague, with no mention of morph fraud or the use
of morphed passport photos in the set, to assess the ex-
tent to which individuals can generally detect digitally
manipulated face photos. On each trial, participants
were presented with an array containing ten face photos
(five genuine, five morph; two 30%, two 40%, and one
50%). Each image was tagged with a letter (A–J), and
participants were required to enter the letters, via key-
board key, for the images they thought had been digitally
manipulated. There were six self-paced trials providing a
total of 30 morphs and 30 genuine foils. Genuine images
and morphs appeared in each image location within the
array with equal probability across the task.
In Robertson et al. (2017), participants were presented
with an information screen which made them aware of
the use of morphs in identity fraud and in the experi-
ment stimulus set, in addition to some basic guidance
on how to detect morphs (i.e., look for a ‘ghost-like’ out-
line of another face; look for the outline of another per-
son’s hair over the forehead). In the present study,
participants in both groups received this basic morph
detection information following completion of the base-
line task.
In the morph training section of the experiment, the
Training Group were then presented with 20 pairs of
face photos and were made aware that one image would
always be genuine and one image would always be a
morph (eight 30%, eight 40%, four 50%). Participants
had to detect which of the images was a morph, and as
shown in Fig. 3, feedback was provided on each trial, as
was additional time (3000 ms) to inspect the morph
once it had been revealed. The left/right presentation of
the morph was counterbalanced. The Guidance Group
Table 1 Sample characteristics
Guidance Group (n = 40) Training Group (n = 40)
Age (years) Mean = 30 SD = 12 Range = 16–54 Mean = 31 SD = 12 Range = 16–57
Sex (n) 15 Male 25 Female 63% Female 17 Male 23 Female 58% Female
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completed a 20-trial selective attention task in which they
had to detect a number target in one of two circular letter
search arrays. Response feedback was provided, and the
timing within the block was identical to the morph train-
ing task. One of the letter circles was always presented in
lower case, the other in upper case (left/right counterba-
lanced), to emulate the genuine/morph distinction experi-
enced by the Training Group (i.e., same stimulus category,
different visual properties). Both the morph training task
and the selective attention task required visual search
within and between left/right stimuli.
Following detection guidance or morph training, all
participants completed a final block of the multi-image
morph detection task, with the knowledge that the digit-
ally manipulated images they should try to detect were
morphs. The procedure for this block was otherwise
identical to the baseline morph detection task. Within
participants, no genuine image or morph was repeated
across the experiment, and across participants, both
types of face photo were selected at random for use in
the baseline and post-guidance/training morph detection
tasks, as well as in the morph training block. In the
Training Group, 16 images were randomly selected from
each set (6 for the baseline detection task, 4 for the
training task, and 6 for the post-guidance/training detec-
tion task) and 12 images from each set were randomly
Fig. 3 The experimental procedure. Both groups completed the baseline morph detection task and then received basic morph detection
guidance. The Training Group then completed the morph training/performance feedback task, and the Guidance Group completed a selective
attention control task. Both groups completed the post-guidance/training morph detection task and the Models Face Matching Test (MFMT).
(Owing to copyright restrictions, images from the MFMT are not displayed in this figure; however, the images shown are a close approximation
of the stimuli used and are not bound by copyright restrictions [CC0].)
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selected for the Control Group (6/6 per baseline and
post-guidance/training detection task). The testing ses-
sion ended upon completion of the MFMT.
Results
Baseline morph detection performance
As shown in Table 2, the mean detection sensitivity
score (d') for each grade of morph was poor, with over-
all percentage hit rates at chance level (48%). Import-
antly, 2 × 3 mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA)
on d' and criterion c scores, with the factors of group
(Training, Guidance) and morph grade (30%, 40%,
50%), revealed no group differences on either measure
(p > .116). The analysis also revealed a bias towards the
detection of 50% and 30% morphs over 40% morphs
[F(2, 156) = 10.37, p < .001, ηp
2 = .12 for the main effect
of morph grade on c scores; p < .005 for the morph
grade differences]. The lack of group differences in the
baseline morph detection task confirms that any
post-training effects cannot be the result of baseline
differences in detection performance.
Post-guidance/training morph detection performance
Participants’ mean detection sensitivity (d') scores
were entered into a 2 × 2 × 3 mixed design ANOVA
with the between-subjects factor of group (Training Group,
Guidance Group) and the within-subjects factors of time
(Before Guidance/Training, After Guidance/Training) and
morph grade (30%, 40%, 50%). The descriptive statistics are
presented in Table 2.
The ANOVA revealed main effects of morph grade and
time, which were qualified by a morph grade × time inter-
action [F(2, 156) = 11.06, p < .001, ηp
2 = .12]. As expected,
morph detection rates were significantly higher in the
post-guidance/training morph detection task at each
morph grade than in baseline performance (p’s < .001),
and the source of the interaction was a greater improve-
ment in performance for 40% morphs (M = 2.20, SD =
1.30) than in the other two morph grades (M = 1.70, SD =
1.23 for 30% morphs; M = 1.74, SD = 1.41 for 50% morphs;
p < .001 for the differences). This is likely to be a result of
the initial lower baseline detection rates for the 40%
morphs reported above. These levels of improvement led
to greater detection sensitivity for 40% (M = 2.55, SD =
1.21) and 50% (M = 2.50, SD = 1.15) morphs than for
30% morphs (M = 2.31, SD = 1.09; p’s < .026 for the
differences) in the post-guidance/training morph task.
This pattern of detection rates replicates the findings
of Robertson et al. (2017; Experiment 2) in showing
that morphs get easier to detect the closer they get
to the 50% ratio (of Identity 1 and Identity 2), when
participants are made aware of morph fraud and
their presence in the image set.
Although there was no overall main effect of group
(F < 1), there was a significant interaction between
group and time [F(1, 78) = 5.36, p = .023, ηp
2 = .06].
While detection sensitivity significantly increased in
the post-guidance/training arrays in both groups
[t(39) = − 10.36, p < .001 for the Guidance Group;
t(39) = − 10.82, p < .001 for the Training Group], im-
portantly, as shown in Fig. 4, the source of the inter-
action was a significantly greater increase in morph
detection sensitivity for the Training Group (M = 2.18,
SD = 1.27) compared to the Guidance Group [M =
1.59, SD = 0.97; t(78) = 2.31, p = .023, d = .522 for the
difference]. The remaining two-way interaction and the
three-way interaction were not significant (p’s > .215), in-
dicating that the improvement in morph detection per-
formance as a result of the morph training task was
equally effective at each morph grade. A final ANOVA on
post-guidance/training array criterion c scores, with the
factors of group, morph grade and time, revealed no sig-
nificant group differences (all F’s < 1).
These findings show that our rudimentary detection
guidance plus training led to a greater improvement in
morph detection rates than the rudimentary detection
guidance alone. In overall percentage hit terms, as
shown in Table 2, the basic morph awareness informa-
tion received by the Guidance Group led to a 21%
increase in morph detection rates to 70%, whereas in the
Training Group the improvement was 34%, leading to a
79% overall morph hit rate.
Table 2 Mean performance scores both pre- and post-
guidance/training
Baseline Performance
Guidance Group Training Group
Hits (%) FA (%) d' c Hits (%) FA (%) d' c
30% Morphs 53 23 0.76 0.36 46 27 0.47 0.38
40% Morphs 39 23 0.38 0.55 40 27 0.31 0.46
50% Morphs 59 23 0.96 0.26 52 27 0.56 0.34
All Morphs 50 23 0.70 0.39 45 27 0.45 0.40
Post-Guidance/Training Performance
Guidance Group Training Group
Hits (%) FA (%) d' c Hits (%) FA (%) d' c
30% Morphs 65 7 2.15 0.60 74 7 2.48 0.50
40% Morphs 73 7 2.41 0.47 79 7 2.69 0.39
50% Morphs 75 7 2.32 0.52 85 7 2.69 0.39
All Morphs 71 7 2.29 0.53 79 7 2.62 0.43
Abbreviations: d′ Detection sensitivity, c Criterion score, FA False alarm
Note: Because of the experimental design, when assessing morph detection
sensitivity at each morph grade, the FA rate remains constant as the different
morph grades were presented within the same array
All Morphs show performance averaged across morph grades (30%, 40%, 50%)
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Morph training and control task performance
For the Training Group, mean accuracy on the morph
training task was 89% (SD = 15%, range = 35%–100%),
showing that even when participants were made aware
that one of two images was definitely a morph, perfect
levels of performance were not achieved. For the Guid-
ance Group, mean accuracy on the selective attention
task was 98% (SD = 3%, range = 90%–100%).
Individual differences in morph detection improvement
The findings described above, reported at the group
level, show that targeted morph training enhanced de-
tection rates to a greater extent than basic morph detec-
tion guidance; yet, it remains unknown whether the
training benefits all participants equally. To assess this,
we split each group into two sections, each containing
the 20 participants with the lowest and highest d' scores
(averaged across the conditions) from the baseline detec-
tion task. We then calculated each participant’s improve-
ment in detection sensitivity by subtracting their d' score
post-guidance/training from their baseline score. Al-
though, as described above, initial performance on the
baseline detection task was poor at the group level, there
was still a degree of variation in scores, as shown in
Fig. 5. Baseline morph detection scores were significantly
different between the low and high performers in each
group (p < .001).
The analysis revealed that, for low performers, the
mean improvement in detection sensitivity scores was
significantly higher for those in the Training Group
(M = 2.83, SD = 1.04) than for those in the Guidance
Group [M = 1.67, SD = 1.08; t(38) = 3.465, p = .001].
However, no such difference was found between the
groups for high performers (M = 1.52, SD = 1.15 for
Training; M = 1.51, SD = .86 for Guidance; t < 1). This
suggests that the targeted morph training task is likely to
be effective for individuals who initially are particularly
poor at detecting these images, whereas such training is
not likely to facilitate further improvement in high
performers over and above rudimentary morph detection
guidance.
Individual differences in morph detection and MFMT
accuracy
There were no group differences in MFMT scores, either
for overall accuracy or for the individual match and
mismatch conditions (F < 1). Across the groups, mean
MFMT accuracy was 73% (SD = 10%, range = 40%–97%),
a score that is in line with previously published norms
for this test (see Dowsett & Burton, 2015; Robertson et
al., 2016). Previous work by Megreya and Burton (2007)
has shown that individuals’ accuracy on the match and
mismatch components of unfamiliar face matching tests
do not correlate. That is, one can perform well at detect-
ing that two unfamiliar faces show the same person and
poorly at detecting when they are different people, and
this pattern was replicated in the current data (r = −.178,
n = 80, p = .113).
Baseline morph detection performance
For both the Guidance Group and the Training Group,
there were no significant correlations between baseline
d' scores and MFMT overall accuracy (r = .066, n = 40,
p = .685 for Guidance; r = −.027, n = 40, p = .868 for
Training), match trial accuracy (r = .010, n = 40, p = .951
for Guidance; r = −.184, n = 40, p = .256 for Training),
or mismatch trial accuracy (r = .072, n = 40, p = .657 for
Guidance; r = .137, n = 40, p = .398 for Training). This
indicates that when individuals were given only very gen-
eral task instructions (pick out images that have been
Fig. 4 Mean detection sensitivity scores (d') showing the improvement in morph detection performance between the pre- and post-training
arrays. The data are presented as a function of morph grade and group
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digitally manipulated), high levels of accuracy on a face
identification task do not confer a morph detection advan-
tage. This could be due to the fact that detection rates are
consistently poor across participants.
Post-guidance/training morph detection performance
For the Guidance Group, there were no correlations
between morph detection sensitivity scores in the
post-guidance/training arrays and overall MFMT
accuracy (r = .124, n = 40, p = .448) or match trials ac-
curacy (r = −.210, n = 40, p = .194). However, there was
a significant positive association between participants’
MFMT mismatch accuracy and overall morph detec-
tion sensitivity (r = .395, n = 40, p = .012). This sug-
gests that face identification ability does generalise to
morph detection performance when specific task in-
structions are provided. This finding replicates the
effect reported by Robertson et al. (2017) in a larger
Fig. 5 Individual d' scores for each participant in each group in the baseline morph detection task (grey) and the post-guidance/training morph
detection task (black). Within each group (Guidance, Training), participants’ scores are arranged from high to low performers (1–40) in the pre-
guidance/training morph detection task
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sample and with different face-matching and morph
detection tasks. Although this suggests that individ-
uals who perform highly on the mismatch conditions
of unfamiliar face matching tests are likely to be better
at detecting face morphs, in both the current study
and in Robertson et al. (2017), the correlations have
been modest in size and marginal in significance.
Further research is therefore still required to confirm
how robust this effect is.
For the Training Group, there were no significant correla-
tions between d' scores in the post-guidance/training arrays
and overall MFMT accuracy (r= .061, n = 40, p= .710),
match trial accuracy (r=−.150, n = 40, p= .356) or mis-
match trial accuracy (r= .205, n= 40, p= .205). At first
glance, it is surprising that we do not replicate the relation-
ship between mismatch trial performance on the MFMT
and post-training morph detection rates found in the Guid-
ance Group and in Robertson et al. (2017). However, this
finding is likely to follow from the fact that morph training
provides an advantage to low, but not high, performers, over
and above detection guidance. That is, d' scores have in-
creased in this group for low-performing individuals but not
proportionately in high-performing individuals, which is
likely to have eliminated the equivalent correlation found in
the Guidance Group.
Discussion
In this study we assessed the extent to which morphed
passport photos could be detected without awareness of
them in the stimulus set, and whether morph detection/
performance feedback training could improve detection
rates over rudimentary guidance. In addition, we assessed
whether face-matching aptitude on the MFMT was asso-
ciated with morph detection ability. Our findings show
that overall morph hit rates, when individuals were given
only a general instruction to detect digitally manipulated
images (i.e., “images that don’t look quite right”), were at
chance level. This finding is in line with recent work by
Nightingale, Wade, and Watson (2017), who reported
poor detection rates—just above chance level—for digit-
ally manipulated scenes. That participants were initially
unable to detect the morphs is a cause for concern for
passport-issuing authorities, because it suggests that the
opportunistic use of morphs with new passport applica-
tions is likely to go undetected when staff are unaware, or
are not actively seeking to detect, this type of fraud.
For the morph detection training, performance was
not perfect, with 10% errors occurring on average, des-
pite participants’ being made aware that one of the two
images would always be genuine. This shows that even
when individuals are explicitly asked to detect morphs
by scanning both images in detail, some morphs remain
difficult to detect. Despite this, performance on the
post-guidance/training arrays show the clear benefit of
having completed the morph training task in comparison
to rudimentary morph detection guidance received by
the Guidance Group and as used previously by Robert-
son et al. (2017).
One of the key aspects of the morph training task is
likely to be the use of performance feedback (see White,
Kemp, Jenkins, & Burton, 2014). On each trial, after a re-
sponse was made, the morph image was always revealed,
and it remained on-screen for a short period of time for
further inspection. This is likely to be helpful in learning
to identify the cues that give rise to the detection of
morphs, particularly on trials in which participants failed
to detect the morph. Although our short (20 trials) tar-
geted morph training did improve morph detection rates
to around 80% of morphs detected, this still falls short of
perfect levels of performance.
Moreover, morph training was effective only for indi-
viduals who performed particularly poorly on the initial
baseline detection task. Morph training provided no
additional detection advantage, over and above basic de-
tection guidance, for individuals who performed rela-
tively well at the outset of the task. White, Kemp,
Jenkins, and Burton (2014) reported a similar effect in
which trial-by-trial feedback training conferred the
greatest advantage to low performers on the GFMT.
They noted that accuracy in high performers may not
have improved owing to constraints on perceptual pro-
cessing or limitations to the information provided in the
image. The same thought could apply to the present
study, that high performers reach task ceiling perform-
ance after receiving the basic detection guidance, and
limitations within the images (i.e., images with very few
morph ‘cues’) or to their perceptual ability (i.e., a limit to
the ability to perceptive the least obvious manipulations)
prevent further improvement in performance. If that is
the case, then the more sophisticated the morph, the less
likely it is that a human operator would detect it, even
when motivated to try.
Although the morph training task did improve per-
formance in low performers, future research should
determine whether this is a transient or lasting effect
(i.e., manipulate the time interval between training and
test), because it is likely that officials may not encounter
this type of fraud on a high-frequency basis. In addition,
further studies should assess whether training on one
morph set leads to an improvement in the detection of
morphs derived from a different image set, as passport
officials/border control officers are likely to encounter
highly variable morphs, both in terms of quality and
construction. Although security is paramount, if practi-
tioners were able to share morphs recovered from fraud-
sters with researchers, training methods with greater
ecological validity could also be developed.
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Our study also revealed a positive association between
accuracy on the MFMT mismatch condition and overall
morph detection ability in the Guidance Group. That is,
participants who perform better at identifying that two
similar looking faces are in fact different people also
detect a greater proportion of morphs. This finding rep-
licates the tentative effect reported by Robertson et al.
(2017) and provides further evidence—using a larger
sample, a separate face-matching test and a different
morph task—that this may be a reliable effect. However,
the correlation reported in the present study, like that de-
scribed by Robertson et al. (2017), was modest in size and
only marginally significant; therefore, further large-scale
studies are required to assess how robust this relation-
ship is. Despite this, Metropolitan Police SRs have
been shown to outperform control individuals on the
MFMT (Robertson et al., 2016), which leads to the
intriguing possibility, should the correlation be found
to be reliable, that such individuals could also perform
better than the present sample at morphed passport
photo detection. If that were found to be the case,
such individuals could be deployed as a potential
countermeasure to morph fraud (see Noyes, Phillips,
& O’Toole, 2017, for a recent review on SR research).
Post-guidance/training morph detection rates con-
formed to the pattern reported by Robertson et al.
(2017), with morphs closer to the 50% centre point
being easiest to detect. However, in the baseline
morph detection task, there was a slight bias away
from categorising 40% morphs as manipulated images.
It could be the case that 30% and 50% morphs were
detected more often because the two face shapes have
not yet blended completely (30%) and the cues related
to overlapping hair, for example, from one identity
are present to a greater degree (50%). However, when
participants are made aware of what to look for when
detecting morphs, both types of cue are then appar-
ent, albeit to lesser degrees, in the 40% morphs,
which could have led to the greatest improvement in
detection sensitivity in that condition.
Although the present study focuses on the use of
modern digital tools to commit sophisticated identity
fraud, the use of morphs are part of the wider evolu-
tion in identity deception techniques. For example, in
one case of identity fraud, it was reported that a
young Asian man had stolen the passport of an eld-
erly white man. Using a hyper-realistic silicone mask
which looked like the legitimate passport owner, the
individual was able to pass several identity checks at
a Hong Kong airport. The use of the mask was dis-
covered only when the perpetrator decided to remove
it mid-flight (Zamost, 2010). Despite this report oc-
curring almost a decade ago, and with other such
reports also occurring (see Bernstein, 2010), a recent
study by Sanders et al. (2017) provided the first as-
sessment of participants’ ability to detect the use of a
hyper-realistic silicone mask as a method of physical
identity deception. Their research showed that only
6% of participants detected that a confederate was
wearing a mask at spontaneous or prompted report,
and this rose to just 57% when asked directly. These
findings show that hyper-realistic masks do provide a
viable route to identity fraud, and taken together with
the findings of the present study, they show that a
concerted approach is required to ensure that we
focus both on combatting advances in digital and
physical identity fraud techniques.
Conclusions
Providing passport-issuing officials with morph detec-
tion training is likely to significantly decrease the likeli-
hood of FOG passports’ being issued with a morphed
photo. Our findings suggest that individuals who score
highly in detecting that two similar looking faces are in
fact different people may also be better at detecting
morphs. Further research is required to assess whether
SRs could be deployed as an effective morph fraud coun-
termeasure, and a combined effort is required to combat
both digital (morphs) and physical (hyper-realistic masks)
advances in identity deception techniques.
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